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Abstract—This paper is a digest of the thesis on predicting
cyber attacks in a collaborative environment. While previous
works mostly focused on predicting attacks as seen from a single
observation point, we proposed taking advantage of collaboration
and exchange of intrusion detection alerts among organizations
and networks. Thus, we can observe the cyber attack on a
large scale and predict the next action of an adversary and its
target. The thesis follows the three levels of cyber situational
awareness: perception, comprehension, and projection. In the
perception phase, we discuss the improvements of intrusion
detection systems that allow for sharing intrusion detection
alerts and their correlation. In the comprehension phase, we
employed data mining to discover frequent attack patterns. In
the projection phase, we present the analytical framework for
the predictive analysis of the alerts backed by data mining
and contemporary data processing approaches. The results are
shown from experimental evaluation in the security alert sharing
platform SABU, where real-world alerts from Czech academic
and commercial networks are shared. The thesis is accompanied
by the implementation of the analytical framework and a dataset
that provides a baseline for future work.
Index Terms—intrusion detection, alert correlation, informa-
tion sharing, collaboration, prediction, situational awareness
I. INTRODUCTION
Collaboration has emerged as an important topic in network
security, namely in the form of information exchange [16, 17],
collaborative intrusion detection systems [18, 19], collabora-
tive correlation of intrusion detection alerts [20], and other
areas [21]. The security teams incline to share the knowledge
and experience, as well as timely information on current
threats and attack, since the foundation of cyber security as we
know it as of today. Sharing of timely information on current
threats and attacks seems to be a promising form of early
warning [22], which can be used to take preemptive measures
to defend a network. It is no surprise that both researchers and
practitioners have taken the initiative to create methods and
build tools that would allow automated security information
exchange and use them to increase the level of protection of
the networks.
This paper is a digest of the thesis on predicting cyber
attacks and the next step of an adversary in a collaborative
environment [1], one of the promising use cases of security
information exchange [19]. In the past, we have seen many
attempts to predict the upcoming attacks or attack steps. How-
ever, a majority of such methods faced serious drawbacks that
caused these methods never to reach technological maturity
and deployment in production. For example, they required a
library of attack descriptions or an observation point with very
detailed visibility into the network traffic and highly precise in-
trusion detection. It was, and still is, highly demanding to have
a single observation point in the network that could provide
every piece of information needed to detect and successfully
predict the next event in an ongoing attack. Learning from
the past to predict future attacks can also be problematic
in the continuously evolving threat landscape. However, a
collaborative approach seems to make the problem easier to
approach. First, many attacks, e.g., malware infections, were
observed to happen in the same fashion in close time and
across large network areas. Thus, we can use observations
from a friendly network to predict upcoming events in our net-
work. The collaboration and information exchange may serve
as an early warning system [22]. In addition, heterogeneity
of intrusion detection systems may provide a complex view
on an attack even though the individual intrusion detection
systems do not have complete detection capabilities and, thus,
may complement each other [18].
Predicting the next step of an adversary is an integral part of
cyber situational awareness [23], an application of the concept
of situational awareness into cyber security. One of the most
widely used definitions of situational awareness is the one by
Endsley [24]: “Perception of the elements in the environment
within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their
meaning and the projection of their status in the near future.”
The thesis [1] illustrates how to increase cyber situational
awareness in its three levels: perception, comprehension, and
projection [25], from collecting alerts from multiple sources
to analyzing them and predicting the next move of an ad-
versary. Research on predicting cyber attacks have not been
conducted in a collaborative environment yet. Although such
an environment would seem much more difficult to perceive
and comprehend, and, in many aspects, it really is, it opens
new possibilities for projecting cyber attacks. Not only we
aim to predict when the attackers strike and how, but also
which targets will they choose and where can we observe the
associated events.
This paper is structured into seven sections. The research
questions are stated in Section II. The background of the thesis
is summarized in Section III. The contributions of the thesis
are summarized in the following three sections. Section IV
discusses improvements in the perception level, i.e., extending
capabilities of intrusion detection systems towards information
sharing. Comprehension of the shared intrusion detection alerts
via alert correlation and data mining is discussed in Section V.
Section VI discusses attack prediction using shared alerts and
mined predictive rules. Finally, Section VII concludes the
paper with answers to research questions, and suggests future
research.
II. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
To formalize the scope of the thesis [1], we posed three
research questions. Notice that the research questions follow
the levels of situational awareness, on which this whole thesis
is structured. The research questions are as follows:
(i) How can we make use of security alert sharing for
building cyber situational awareness?
First, we aimed at investigating the capabilities of cybersecu-
rity alert sharing platforms from technical and non-technical
perspectives. To build cyber situational awareness using the
shared data, we need to ensure, from the technical perspective,
that the sharing platform is automated and delivers accurate
and timely information about relevant cybersecurity events
in the collaborating networks [16]. From the non-technical
perspective, a sharing community needs to be established,
so that the data are rich in heterogeneity and relevant for
correlations [26]. Further, questions of trust and privacy issues
may appear in a collaborative environment [19]. Fulfilling
all the conditions and prerequisites would then enable us to
receive relevant data for further research, which relates to the
perception level of situational awareness.
(ii) How to understand shared security alerts and effectively
discover patterns in such data?
Second, there was a need to understand the data and discover
relations and repeating patterns in them. Simple statistical
approaches were not sufficient in this case, given the nature of
the data. There are many events related to cyber security that
are expected to appear frequently in the data. For example,
alerts of network scanning are expected to fold the majority
of the shared alerts due to the omnipresent nature of network
scans and their relatively easy detection [27]. What we were
looking for, however, were the hidden attack patterns, that
would not be noticed in plain sight. Data mining is a suitable
approach to discovering such patterns, and its usage in cyber
security is on the rise these days [28]. Understanding the data
and knowing about frequent patterns in the data correspond to
the comprehension level of situational awareness.
(iii) How can we predict upcoming cybersecurity events,
and how can we evaluate such predictions?
Finally, when the relations and patterns in cybersecurity alerts
are discovered, we may use them to predict future events. This
task was studied in earlier works [2], but not in a collaborative
environment, which promises a larger overview and new
capabilities of attack predictions. The open question, however,
is a task of evaluating the prediction. This task is feasible in
a laboratory environment but is problematic in live networks
as it would require the execution of an intrusion and access
to the exploited hosts. Large-scale collaborative environment
makes this task even harder. Altogether, this research question
corresponds to the projection level of situational awareness.
III. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
Background for this thesis is composed of two main topics.
The first topic is collaboration and information exchange in
cyber security. The second is the topic of attack projection,
prediction, and forecasting.
The topics of collaboration and information exchange were
always present in the field of cyber security, and are well
documented in the technical [16, 17] and scientific [18, 19,
21] literature. Therefore, we focused on automated informa-
tion exchange, such as in collaborative intrusion detection
systems and alert sharing platforms. Non-technical aspects of
information sharing, such as community management, legal
obligations, and issues of trust among the sharing peers, were
shown to be at least of the same interest as the technical
implementations. Both technical and non-technical aspects of
information sharing were illustrated on an example of an
intrusion detection alert sharing platform SABU1, in which
we conducted the experiments and measurements presented
in the thesis. A schema of SABU is depicted in Figure 1,
where we depicted the core functionality of the platform in
the top half of the image. The central component of the
platform is Warden, a hub where all the alerts are sent to
and redistributed to recipients. The data are alerts provided
by intrusion detection systems, honeypots, and other tools,
such as third-party alert sharing platforms. The sources of
data are deployed in heterogeneous networks of academic
and commercial institutions. Warden sends the data to the
recipients, such as incident handlers and analysts in security
teams and automated active network defense devices. The
bottom half of the figure depicts the AIDA framework, which
is another outcome of the thesis and is discussed later in this
paper. In short, the AIDA framework receives the alerts from
Warden, processes them, makes predictions, and sends alerts
of predicted events back to Warden.
To cover the background on the second topic, we conducted
a thorough literature review of attack projection, prediction
and forecasting methods [2]. The problem was set in a context
of research on intrusion detection and cyber situational aware-
ness. A taxonomy of methods was provided, and each category
was described in detail and evaluated. Briefly, the traditional
methods are based on discrete or continuous models. Discrete
models, such as attack graphs and their stochastic variants,
allow for modelling the attacks and predicting the next move
of an adversary via matching the attacker’s behavior to a
known attack model [29]. Continuous models, such as time
series, allow for predicting changes in the security situation
and increase or decrease in attack rates. Novel methods based
on machine learning and data mining allow for automated
extraction of attack models for discrete methods [30] or























































Fig. 1. The schema of AIDA, framework for correlation and analysis of intrusion detection alerts.
are also numerous other methods that are either very novel,
not well known, or highly specialized.
IV. PERCEPTION LEVEL: INTRUSION DETECTION
To answer the first research question, we had to review what
types of information are being shared among the cybersecurity
community. The alerts raised by honeypots and intrusion
detection systems and shared via SABU alert sharing platform
proved to be valuable source of information for increasing the
cyber situational awareness as they describe what is happening
in the networks that share the information. Thus, we delved
deeper into the alerts and sources of the data and discussed
how the major intrusion detection systems contribute to the
alert sharing platform, what alerts they provide, and how they
could be improved or adjusted for the tasks discussed in the
thesis. The two most important sources of intrusion detection
alerts that contribute to the SABU alert sharing platform are
network-based intrusion detection systems and honeypots.
The first source of alerts is a plethora of network-based
intrusion detection systems. Due to the interests of the research
community centered around alert sharing platform SABU,
we focused on network flow monitoring [32] and flow-based
intrusion detection [33]. We used flow monitoring extended
by HTTP parsing to enhance the capabilities of flow-based
intrusion detection towards more fine-grained detection of
network reconnaissance activities. Knowledge of the HTTP
requests on a large-scale allowed us to detect application-level
network scans and brute-force attacks against web services that
were found to frequently complement each other and, thus,
displaying an interesting attack pattern [3]. Subsequently, we
discussed preliminary approaches to detect attack patterns via
means of complex event processing [4], which provided a solid
technical background for later work. Further, we observed
events, such as web crawling and accesses to phishing web-
sites, that would otherwise be undetectable with plain network
flow monitoring [5].
The second source of alerts are the honeypots that are ideal
for the analysis of potentially malicious network traffic as
any packet incoming to a honeypot is by nature suspicious.
We discussed how to monitor the honeypots and how to
use them as a source of alerts [6]. Due to observations of
the behavior of honeypots during large-scale DDoS attack,
we were able to identify problematic network traffic that
causes false positive alerts raised by honeypots [7]. As we
showed in a case study, honeypots are not so free of false-
positives as they were believed to be and might become a
burden in certain situations, such as during the reflected DDoS
attacks (DRDoS), in which the honeypots may be abused as
reflectors of malicious network traffic. In another study on
using honeypots, we illustrated how to capture phishing emails
to speed up the reaction to phishing campaigns [5]. Capturing
phishing emails at honeypots and using network monitoring
to detect accesses to phishing websites contributed to the list
of interesting patterns in malicious activity.
The contributions of the first research direction of the thesis
are mostly in finding ways to improve existing tools and
approaches or finding compliance with various novel require-
ments, both technical and non-technical. Technical issues were
covered by an increase in the variety of the intrusion detection
systems and their outputs, more fine-grained detection meth-
ods, and reducing false-positive detections. The non-technical
issues were mostly related to assuring the quality of intrusion
detection alerts and managing the sharing community. How-
ever, a novel issue emerged with novel legal frameworks, such
as GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation), which raised
uncertainty among the sharing community [8]. GDPR states
that IP addresses and other identifiers, which are shared within
the SABU platform, are personal data. Thus, we found a way
to comply with the law by identifying risks to privacy [8]
and conducting a balance test that showed that the benefits of
information sharing in cyber security are higher than risks of
harm to privacy [9].
The main outcomes of the first research directions are as
follows. First, the network-based intrusion detection system
can use novel approaches of extended flow monitoring to
detect more fine-grained events that could be used later [3].
Second, even the honeypots can produce false-positive alerts,
even though they were believed to not do so. Nevertheless, the
information exchange can help in identifying the false positive
alerts [7]. Outside of the technical perspective, one has to be
careful about the legal issues regarding privacy, which became
an important issue for security practitioners [9].
V. COMPREHENSION LEVEL: ALERT CORRELATION
The second research question aims at problems associated
with the comprehension of security alerts and the effective
discovery of attack patterns to achieve the comprehension
level of situational awareness. First, the preliminary visual
analytics [10] suggested several directions, in which we started
investigating the alerts. Alert aggregation [11] emerged as an
important topic to address. Subsequently, we discussed the
use of data mining methods to analyze the alerts and discover
attack patterns.
In order to extract knowledge from the data, wee loosely
followed the phases of alert correlation that were set in the fun-
damental related work [34]. However, in our situation, we had
to deal with the alerts from heterogeneous sources distributed
in the network address space as well as geographically and or-
ganizationally. Our first attempts involved attempts to capture
and visualize the relations between various data sources and
types of data they shared [10]. The preliminary visualizations
helped us to identify the need for alert aggregation, for which
we elaborated typical use cases and found out that over 85 %
of the alerts can be aggregated [11]. In more detail, about 1 %
of the alerts are duplicates that appear due to errors or sharing
already shared information. More than 54 % of the alerts are
continuations, i.e., alerts of events that were already reported
but still continue, such as long-term scans. The remainder of
the aggregable alerts are alerts from different data sources that
report the same event, such as large-scale scans.
In the next stage of the analysis, we examined the data
mining methods and identified methods that are suitable for
the task of extracting attack models. The methods of sequential
pattern and rule mining proved suitable for our tasks; the
sequences correspond to the series of actions of attackers as
observed by the intrusion detection systems [12]. Namely, the
top-k sequential rule mining [35] offers good performance and
usable results that are directly translatable into predictive rules.
The confidence value of the mined rules, i.e., a probability
that a certain sequence of alerts will be followed by another
as described in the rule, were often found to reach values of
0.8 and 0.9 on a scale from 0 to 1. Subsequently, we exper-
imentally evaluated the use of sequential rules for predicting
attacks [13]. The results showed that the outputs are stable in
time and, thus, a mined rule can be used for prediction at least
in the following days and weeks. Further, most of the rules
predict events at least several minutes before they happen and,
thus, leave enough time to respond to the predictions.
The main contributions of this research direction are the ex-
perimental evaluation of the proposed methods and a detailed
description of hands-on experience with processing the shared
intrusion detection alerts from heterogeneous sources. The
important findings are that almost 85 % of the security alerts
are duplicate entries and can be aggregated in favor of the
15 % of alerts representing unique events [11]. Subsequently,
the methods of sequential pattern and rule mining were shown
to extract usable models of attackers’ activities. Namely, the
top-k sequential rule mining offers good performance and
results that are directly translatable into predictive rules with
a promising confidence [12, 13]. Finally, aggregation of the
alerts increased the usability of the mined rules because
it prevented mining the rules that would describe repeated
reporting of long-lasting events and other patterns frequently
found in the data.
VI. PROJECTION LEVEL: ATTACK PREDICTION
In the third research direction, we discussed the imple-
mentation and evaluation of a framework for security event
prediction in a collaborative environment. First, we introduced
the AIDA framework and discussed the design considerations
and deployment options. We outlined the experiences from
the deployment of the AIDA framework in the alert sharing
platform [14]. Subsequently, we introduced the stand-alone
deployment mode of the AIDA framework that allowed for
experimentation with datasets. Finally, we created our own
dataset that can be used to evaluate the software and reproduce
our results.
AIDA framework2 [14] is a modular framework for the
stream-based analysis of intrusion detection alerts using the
concepts of big data processing, data mining, and complex
event processing. A simplified schema of the AIDA framework
and its deployment in the SABU platform is depicted in
Figure 1. The framework receives alerts from Warden, the
central component of the SABU platform. The alerts are
distributed to processing components of the framework as
a data stream using the Kafka message broker3. The data
are first processed by three components based on Apache
2https://github.com/CSIRT-MU/AIDA-Framework
3https://kafka.apache.org/
Spark4 framework for stream-based data processing. The first
component performs sanitization and semantic filtering of
the data, such as filtering alerts of low interest. The other
two components perform aggregation and data mining, as
described in previous works [11, 12, 13]. The rules, mined
by the top-k sequential rule mining algorithm [35], are stored
in a database, where they are accessed by the rule matching
component. The rule matching component is based on Esper5
and its Event Processing Language (ELP) that allows for
translation of the sequential rules into SQL-like queries over
the stream of alerts. If the first part of the rule is found using
the ELP query, the remainder of the rule is predicted and
reported as an alert that is sent back to Warden.
To allow for the reproducibility of the results and further
experimentations with the shared data and the AIDA frame-
work, we collected and published a dataset [15]. The dataset
contains intrusion detection alerts obtained via an alert sharing
platform SABU for one week. A plethora of heterogeneous
intrusion detection systems and honeypots deployed across
several organizations contributed to the sharing platform. The
alerts are stored in the IDEA format6 and categorized using
the taxonomy of security events included in the IDEA defini-
tion. The network entities (IP addresses, hostnames, etc.) are
anonymized. However, the list of interesting features (presence
on blacklists, geolocation, etc.) of such entities at the time of
data collection is provided.
The main contribution of this research direction is the
development of the AIDA framework and achieving the final
level of situational awareness by projecting the upcoming
attack in operational deployment. Creating and publishing the
dataset and publishing the AIDA framework as open-source
software allows for the reproducibility of our research and
may serve for our future work as well as for the future work
of the research community.
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This paper provided a digest of a thesis on predicting
network attacks in collaborative environment [1]. The thesis
and this paper are loosely structured by the research questions
that correspond to the three levels of situational awareness
(perception, comprehension, and prediction). The research
questions were stated and discussed in Section II and answered
in Sections IV–VI. To summarize the whole thesis, we found
out that the sharing of intrusion detection alerts allows for
increasing the cyber situational awareness in all three of its
levels. On the first level, perception, we discussed how to
obtain the alerts from heterogeneous and distributed sources
that allow for interesting observations, such as finding if an
event is isolated or part of a larger event. Various sources of
information may complement each other quite well, even in
scenarios that are not so straightforward. On the second level,
comprehension, we showed how to understand the data and




and data mining. An important observation is that the stability
of the results in the time intervals of days and week allows
for the meaningful usability of the predictive analyses over
the alerts that complete the cyber situational awareness on the
third and final level, projection.
The main contribution of the thesis is the combination
of information sharing with predictive analytics [13, 14], a
combination that was called for [19], yet not thoroughly in-
vestigated. Making use of shared intrusion detection alerts may
also be considered as a contribution due to the heterogeneity
of the data and other aspects that complicate processing
the data [11]. Extracting patterns from the data [12] and
using it to predict upcoming events served not only as an
early warning for receivers of the predicted alerts but also
as a significant data volume reduction process. Instead of
processing millions of alerts per day by every receiving peer
in the sharing platform as observed in SABU, the receivers
may filter and receive only those alerts that are relevant for
their networks and systems [14]. Thus, the predictions serve
the purpose of personalized filtering of the shared data for the
receivers, for which it is easier to process tens or hundreds
of alerts. A major scientific contribution of this work is
also a literature review of attack projection, prediction, and
forecasting methods, that was published as a survey paper [2].
For the sake of reproducibility of our research and also for
use by other researchers, we also crafted a dataset of intrusion
detection alerts from heterogeneous sources and published an
open-source implementation of the AIDA framework that was
used for the experiments.
We believe there is a lot of potential for future work.
As discussed in the thesis, modeling the attack patterns via
graph models could potentially improve the performance of
the pattern matching and predictions. Manipulating with the
parameters of data mining would allow for more interesting
patterns in security events, such as distributed and multi-stage
attacks. Another interesting direction of future work would
be the visualization of the data and the processes discussed
in this thesis. Although we presented visual data analytics
for the preliminary understanding of the shared intrusion
detection alerts [10], it is only a small fraction of what
could be visualized. Finally, a lot of research opportunities
is in the further development of intrusion detection alert
sharing platforms and other collaborative and information
sharing tools. Alert correlation supported by data mining,
attack projection and prediction, and evaluation of the overall
security situation will probably stay as an interesting research
topic as we are constantly facing novel threats, attack vectors,
and attack patterns. Similarly, future cybersecurity operations
may require the sharing of different sets of information,
including the sharing of information on incident response and
attack mitigation. Combining more and more heterogeneous
information from distributed sources allows for a plethora of
research opportunities.
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“Survey of Attack Projection, Prediction, and Forecasting in Cy-
ber Security”. In: IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials 21.1
(Firstquarter 2019), pp. 640–660.
[3] Martin Husák, Petr Velan, and Jan Vykopal. “Security Monitoring of
HTTP Traffic Using Extended Flows”. In: 2015 10th International
Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security. Toulouse: IEEE,
2015, pp. 258–265.
[4] Petr Velan, Martin Husák, and Daniel Tovarňák. “Rapid prototyping
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